WEEKLY COLUMN:
JDM vs the WORLD

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FINE PRINT

In a joint congressional report released just two days after the deaths of Uday and Qusay Hussein last week, it was revealed that the US government did, indeed, possess a wealth of credible, albeit sporadic, information on al-Qaeda’s desire to strike America prior to September 11, 2001. According to this report, “the intelligence community… did not bring together and fully appreciate a range of information that could have greatly enhanced its chances of uncovering and preventing Usama bin Laden’s plan to attack these United States.” So, in terms of averting 9/11, we had the dots but failed to connect them for lack of a single “smoking gun.”

Now, I don’t mean to infer that Uday and Qusay—nor their father, Saddam—had anything to do with the terrorist attacks. They may well have, but, in fairness, the report says no such thing. What I do mean to infer, however, is that, in light of the Second Gulf War, I don’t believe a “smoking gun” pointing straight towards 9/11 would’ve changed anything.

Protestors and peace-mongering leaders would’ve seen to that, for sure.

Last week’s congressional report suggests we were too “reluctant to use U.S. military assets to conduct offensive counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan.” But what if we’d toppled the Taliban, say, three years ago? Sure, it would’ve deprived al-Qaeda of a key state sponsor, and it might’ve delayed 9/11, too, but some of us still would’ve hit the streets bearing signs that read “No Blood For Poppies.” If it happened like that after 9/11, there’s no reason to believe it wouldn’t’ve happened before we learned the lesson of that day. The difference is, without our post-9/11 knowledge, protests against toppling the Taliban would’ve worked.

The terrorists planned their attacks in secrecy, but I say they wasted their time. They could’ve drawn up their plans with crayons and oak tag while riding the PATH to its Trade Center stop, and someone, somewhere, would’ve defended their First Amendment right to do so. Mohammed Atta could’ve gone on Leno and Letterman to explain how he’d blow up America, or told airport security, “Don’t let me on this mechanical bird here,” and at best it would’ve postponed—but not prevented—his taking of 3,000 lives. Accuse me of overstating my case all you want, but the anti-war furor makes this point pretty clear: We were destined to get hit eventually.

Some people just don’t have the guts for national security. For varying reasons ranging from anti-Americanism to unrealistic visions of peace, these people were committed to keeping our guard down. Reluctance to do battle with Baghdad proves this.

Following Saddam’s defeat in the First Gulf War, the United Nations issued Resolution 687, which demanded, among other things, that Iraq not “use, develop, construct or acquire” weapons of mass destruction. This was passed on April 3, 1991. That evil genius, George W. Bush? He was with the third place Texas Rangers that year.

But let’s take a look at some of the other resolutions he apparently designed to fool us into war—the accompanying descriptions for which are lifted directly from WhiteHouse.gov:

-- UNSCR 707 (August 15, 1991): “Iraq must make a full, final and complete disclosure of all aspects of its weapons of mass destruction and missile programs;” “Iraq must allow UN and IAEA inspectors immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access;” “Iraq must cease attempts to conceal or move weapons of mass destruction, and related materials and facilities.”

-- UNSCR 715 (October 11, 1991): “Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors.”

-- UNSCR 949 (October 15, 1994): “Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors.”

Have you noticed a pattern of noncompliance just yet? Good. Guess what: We’re only up to 1994. This would be the same year that George W. Bush was elected governor of Texas. Here are a few more UN resolutions that passed during Bush’s term:

-- UNSCR 1051 (March 27, 1996): “Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.”

-- UNSCR 1060 (June 12, 1996): “Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.”

-- UNSCR 1115 (June 21, 1997): “Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.”

-- UNSCR 1134 (October 23, 1997): “Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.”

-- UNSCR 1137 (November 12, 1997): “Iraq must cooperate fully with UN weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.”

By now, of course, the list is getting a little bit long, not to mention repetitive. The keyword there is “repetitive,” because Saddam’s bad behavior was just that. Let’s look at some further examples, particularly those from ‘98—that was the year when then-Gov. Bush was reelected, the year when then-Pres. Clinton said, “If we turn our backs on his defiance, the credibility of US power as a check against Saddam will be destroyed”:

-- UNSCR 1154 (March 2, 1998): “Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA weapons inspectors and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access, and notes that any violation would have the ‘severest consequences for Iraq.’”

-- UNSCR 1194 (September 9, 1998): “Iraq must cooperate fully with UN and IAEA weapons inspectors, and allow immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access.”

-- UNSCR 1205 (November 5, 1998): “Iraq must provide ‘immediate, complete and unconditional cooperation’ with UN and IAEA inspectors.”

-- UNSCR 1284 (December 17, 1999): “Iraq must allow UNMOVIC ‘immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access’ to Iraqi officials and facilities.”

Then there was 1441, which passed on November 8, 2002, and gave Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations.” The American Heritage Dictionary defines the word “final” as: (1) “Forming or occurring at the end;” (2) “Of or constituting the end result of a succession or process;” and (3) “Not to be changed or reconsidered.” Between his al-Samoud missiles, his unmanned drone, and his false weapons report, Saddam clearly violated this “final” shot—unless, of course, your definition of “final” breaks with that of tradition.

And it’s not like Saddam deserved this final chance, anyway. He wasn’t pursuing WMDs to deter his enemies; if he was, he would’ve told us, “You’re darned right I’ve got them, now leave me alone or else.” That he sought them covertly suggests his intentions to use them. He’s used them before, after all, which is why no sane man ought to have given him the benefit of the doubt here.

What we had against Saddam was an embarrassment of evidence. There was no smoking gun, but there were bullets and bunches of them. As Dick Cheney noted last week, it would’ve been “irresponsible in the extreme” for our government to shrug its shoulders at yet another developing threat.

It was 60 years to the day before 9/11 that Franklin Delano Roosevelt said in a fireside chat, “When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him.” Although we’ll never quite know what that rattlesnake Saddam was up to, the fact that some folks were willing to sit back and find out shows a surprising lack of gumption in the land of the free and the home of the brave. If our enemies hit us once, shame on our enemies. But if they hit us twice for reasons we can stop? Then shame on America, too.

There’s nothing shoot-first-and-ask-questions-later about this. For more than a decade, Saddam gave us all the wrong answers.

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